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Abstract
This paper surveys the recent historiography of  three national patent systems during the period of  the
first industrial revolution – the United States, France and, in particular detail, Britain. The purpose of
the paper is two-fold. First, to show in a comparative framework how the institutional parameters of  a
patent  system  influence  inventive  activity.  Second,  to  show  that  patents  can,  under  certain
circumstances, provide a net benefit to society.
1 Introduction
In essence, a patent constitutes the (temporary) right to exclude others from employing a particular
technology  or  invention.  Certain  requirements  must  be  fulfilled  before  a  patent  can  be  obtained,
though. For example, the invention cannot have been known to the public before the patent is applied
for, otherwise they would be prevented from using technology that had been previously free to use.
With  the  exception  of  the  United  States,  it  was  usual  in  the  nineteenth  century  for  this  novelty
requirement to be defined in terms of  what had been previously used within the same jurisdiction as
that of  the prospective patent, i.e. you may patent in Britain anything that was in use in France, or
indeed wherever else, so long that it was novel within Britain. Now, though, novelty requirements are
defined in global terms. 
Further,  patents  can  only  be  obtained  by  those  responsible  for  developing  the  invention
(although in Europe, the inventor may transfer the right to obtain the patent before the application is
filed) and it is precisely their efforts to invent, that patents are designed to encourage. In particular, by
awarding an inventor the right to exclude prospective competitors from using their technology, they can
appropriate a return above the market rate and recoup their costs of  invention as well as their costs of
production.  This would  not  be  possible  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market.  Of  course,  perfectly
competitive markets rarely occur and indeed, they are especially unlikely to occur in regard to new
technology,  as  large  costs  are  often  involved  with  acquiring  the  relevant  knowledge,  violating  the
assumption of  perfect  information.i Still,  some empirical  studies support  the  inference that  patent
protection subsidises research and development (R&D). One study on French patent renewal data from
between 1970-1987, estimated that patents provided a 25 percent subsidy to company funded R&D
(Schankerman, 1998). In a similar study of  Japanese corporations, it was estimated that the cessation of
patent  protection  would  result  in  a  60  percent  decline  in  R&D  expenditure  by  chemical  firms
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(Granstrand, 1999). There was, however, a wide degree of  sectoral variation. In mechanical firms, the
cessation of  patent protection would have resulted in only a 5 percent decline in R&D expenditure, and
firm  surveys  consistently  show  that  that  the  importance  of  patents  varies  considerably  between
different sectors. In their 2000 paper, Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson and John Walsh surveyed the
appropriation  methods  of  American  firms,  delineating  three  broad  strategies:  exploitation  of
complementary capabilities and lead time, secret working and legal mechanisms, including patenting.
Although these strategies are not mutually exclusive, they concluded that in the majority of  sectors
exploiting  lead  time  and  protecting  secrecy  were  more  important  appropriation  strategies  than
patenting and other legal mechanisms. ii Patenting, however, was found to be important in a minority of
industries, particularly pharmaceuticals and certain classes of  machinery and computing. Pronounced
sectoral differences in appropriation strategies also existed in the nineteenth century. At the 1851 Great
Exhibition, approximately 30 percent of  manufacturing machinery exhibits and 25 percent of  engine
exhibits had been patented. In contrast, the equivalent figure for chemicals was only 5 percent (Moser,
2012). Historical evidence suggests that at least some of  this variation can be attributed to the difficulty
and costs involved with acquiring knowledge of  new technology that competitors are determined to
keep secret. Over the course of  the second half  of  the nineteenth-century, as the tools of  chemical
analysis improved (the introduction of  the Periodic Table was particularly important),  so it became
much easier to reverse-engineer chemicals. The corresponding response by inventors was to eschew
secret working, which had once been widely practised, and to rely instead on patent protection (Moser,
2012).
Thus, the incentive provided by patents to inventive activities is not of  equal importance in
every industrial sector. Rather, it is largely confined to those sectors where the costs of  imitating new
technology are comparatively low. A second strand of  literature goes further, arguing that not only have
the benefits  of  patent protection been overstated,  but that  the  associated societal  costs  have been
hitherto understated. It is well established that because patent protection leads to an increase in price
above the marginal cost of  the product, this in turn reduces output, creating a static dead-weight loss.
From a neo-classical perspective, this is the principal disadvantage with awarding patents (Rosenberg,
1972), but there is now a more nuanced and extensive understanding of  the problems involved with
awarding inventors patent rights.  Technological  development is  inherently cumulative,  but while  an
invention is still protected by a patent, any new technology which makes use of  the invention can only
be commercialised with the permission of  the patent holder. This may be given, but usually in return
for some form of  royalty. Even when there is an active and well functioning market in patent rights, the
transactions costs involved with these exchanges still act to hinder sequential innovation. One study has
compared the amount of  R&D undertaken on those genes which were sequenced by the publicly
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funded Human Genome Project, with those sequenced by the private Celera Corporation. iii It found
that when a gene was first sequenced by Celera, this led to a reduction in subsequent R&D of  between
20-30 percent (Williams, 2013). Moreover, this case study involves a willing licensor. Often licences are
refused, or patents are used strategically to block new developments coming to the market.
Patent rights are also fragmentary. The ever increasing complexity of  technology means that to
produce a new product can involve obtaining access rights to hundreds of  patents, held by a variety of
entities whose interests may not coincide. With so many interested parties with the capacity to block
each-other,  scarce  resources  may  be  underused  –  'the  tragedy  of  the  anticommons'  (Heller  and
Eisenberg, 1998). The problem is exacerbated when these patents are broadly defined and/or overlap
with one another and such a scenario appears to have arisen in nanotechnology, where the U.S. patent
office (USPTO) has awarded more than 1,600 patents that make reference to carbon nanotubes, dozens
of  which claim essentially the same thing (Pearce, 2012). For the researcher or inventor venturing into
this 'patent thicket’, an enormous range of  licences have to be obtained before even the most basic
work  can  be  undertaken.  Ideally,  this  problem  could  be  meliorated  with  a  proper  examination
procedure, which either curtailed and delineated the claims of  applications or rejected outright the
unoriginal. Unfortunately, examination procedures are flawed and overburdened. It is, for example, the
avowed intent of  the USPTO to reject patents for inventions which – if  actually practicable – would
break the  laws of  physics.  This  has failed to stem the flow of  the  incredible  and the application
procedure is now regarded by many as simply one of  registration in all but name (Jaffe and Lerner,
2005).
Another legal requirement for obtaining a patent is to enter a detailed written description of  the
invention (the 'specification') and recent theoretical work indicates that the best-designed IPR systems
are those that over the long-run, augment the pool of  technology that is freely available for commercial
use (Stiglitz, 2014). In practice, however, it is unclear whether patents really are inducing the circulation
of  technical information.  In the United States, frequent enforcement of  Wilful Infringement Rules,
(that if  an infringer can be shown to have had notice of  a patent they were alleged to be infringing,
they  can  be  liable  for  three  times  damages)  has  forced  many  inventors  to  stop  using  patent
specifications as sources of  information. Moreover, it is doubtful whether specifications would actually
provide access to useful technical information anyway. Patentees are advised  not to provide a single
concise description of  the invention as otherwise that can be interpreted as narrowing the scope of  the
patent, but to instead provide as many conceivable variations of  the invention as possible. Engineers
reportedly find patents to be 'unreasonably repetitive and in parts almost incomprehensible' (quoted in
Roin, 2007, p. 2026).
There are a number of  well documented failings with the administration and law of  the United
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States patent system: ineffective examination of  applications has led to the development of  patent
thickets, there are too many incentives for incumbents with the power to exclude newcomers to stymie
sequential technological progress and specifications have been rendered otiose. Although matters are
better within the jurisdiction of  the Japanese and European Patent Offices (the other members of  the
global patent triumvirate), for some, the solution is simply to dispense with patents altogether. This has
been argued most forcefully by Michele Boldrin and David Levine. They start with the premise that
most inventive ideas occur by chance, usually when carrying out a routine production activity (2008, p.
4), and that 'fierce' competition is sufficient for their commercialisation (2008, p. 10). As such, they
suggest that there is little evidence that IPR encourages inventive activity and that patents represent an
‘extraordinary’  and monopolistic imposition, blocking sequential technological development (2008, p.
128).
'Exhibit A' in this argument, which is discussed over the first five pages of  their 2008 book, is
James Watt's patent for the separate condenser. Watt's condenser was the most important invention in
steam engineering in the second half  of  the eighteenth century and, by radically improving the fuel
efficiency of  steam engines, it was instrumental to the adaptation and adoption of  the steam engine as
a source of  power to a plethora of  new industrial activities, such as cotton spinning and iron smelting.
However,  according to Boldrin and Levine,  Watt and his business partner,  Matthew Boulton,  were
apparently uninterested in manufacturing steam engines themselves, and ‘few steam engines were built
during the period of  Watt’s legal monopoly’. Instead,  ‘their activity consisted primarily of  extracting
hefty monopolistic royalties through licensing’ and, to this end, they ‘used the patent system as a legal
cudgel with which to smash competition’  (2008, p. 2).  This,  claim Boldrin and Levine, stymied the
adoption of  the steam engine by potential users and arrested the development of  steam-engineering
technology: 'Boulton and Watt's steam engine patent most likely delayed the industrial revolution by a
couple of  decades' (2013, p. 38).
This  betrays  a  naïvely  reductionist  view  of  the  industrial  revolution:  it  was  a  much  more
complex and variegated event than simply the development of  the steam engine (as important as that
was).  Also,  as  we will  see later,  matters  concerning Watt's  patent were  far  more complicated than
Boldrin and Levine suggest. It is also misleading to suggest that there empirical evidence in support of
patents is sparse. One study has found that the introduction of  pharmaceutical patents in developed
countries led to a statistically significant increase in domestic R&D expenditure and pharmaceutical
patents obtained by nationals in the United States (Qian, 2007). However, patents had no such effect in
less  developed  countries  without  the  potential  to  innovate:  not  a  single  pharmaceutical  patent
originating from French West Africa was awarded in Europe or the United States during the period of
study (1978-1999). A more wide ranging study up to 54 manufacturing industries in up to 72 countries
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between 1981-2000, has found strikingly similar results. Patent rights were found to be associated with
faster growth – especially in patent-intensive industries such as chemicals – but again, the effect was
greatest in high income countries with the endogenous ability to innovate (Hu and Png, 2013). Firm
level studies confirm the same picture. One study of  236 large British firms between 1968 and 1996,
demonstrated that the size of  a firm's patent stock has an economically and statistically significant
impact on productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002).
Although the terms of  the 'patent' debate have become more sophisticated, there is surprisingly
little  that  is  substantially  new.  The  first  political  economists  were  comfortable  with  the  idea  that
awarding exclusive rights to inventors encouraged their efforts and that this was a superior policy to
offering rewards. Adam Smith, for example, observed that:
the inventor of  a new machine or any other invention has the exclusive priviledge of  making and
vending that invention for the space of  14 years by the law of  this country, as a reward for his
ingenuity,  and  it  is  probable  that  this  is  as  equall  an one as  could be  fallen  upon.  For  if  the
legislature should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of  new machines, etc., they would
hardly ever be so precisely proportiond to the merit of  the invention as this is. For here, if  the
invention be good and such as is profitable to mankind, he will probably make a fortune by it; but if
it be of  no value he also will reap no benefit (Meek, 1982, p. 116).
Across the Channel in France,  Britain's  industrial  success was often attributed to the provision of
patent rights. In 1803, Jean-Baptiste Say wrote:
En Angleterre,  quand un particulier invente un produit  nouveau,  ou bien découvre un procédé
inconnu, il obtient un privilége exclusif  de fabriquer ce produit, ou de se servier de ce procédé.
Comme il n'a point de concurrens dans cette production, il peut en porter le prix fort au-dessus de
ce qui serait nécessaire pour le rembourser de ses avances avec intérêts, er pour payer les profits …
et dans un pays aussi prodigieusement productif  que l'Angleterre … cette récompense est souvent
très-considérable.iv
Even the prototype anarchist,  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (“La propriété, c'est le vol!”), thought temporary
protection for inventors was a social 'necessity' (Machlup, 1950, p. 9). By the mid-nineteenth century,
however,  with the  ascendancy of  the  free  trade movement  and repudiation  of  monopoly,  patents
became an obvious target for reform. In England, the standard bearer for abolition was the classical
liberal  The Economist  and it anticipated many of  the objections made about patents today. One 1851
edition complained that patents stymmied the sequential development of  technology: 'On all inventors
it is especially a prohibition to exercise their faculties; and in proportion as they are more numerous
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than one, it is an impediment to the general advancement, with which it is the duty of  the Legislature
not to interfere' (The Economist, 1851, p. 113). Later, when under the editorship of  Walter Bagehot, a
rudimentary form of  the 'patent thicket' idea appeared, referring to how 'trade is crippled by all sorts of
patents  for  useless,  trivial,  or  “old”  inventions'  (The Economist,  1871,  p.  285).  Although  patent
abolitionists were unsuccessful in England, they successfully lobbied for the abolition of  the Dutch
patent system in 1869 and they were able to delay the introduction of  patents in Swtizerland until 1888
(where  in  1863,  the  Federal  Assembly  had  resolved  that  patents  were  'verderblich  und  verwerflich'
('pernicious and reprehensible'); Machlup, 1950, p. 5).
Historical evidence has often informed the debate on the social utility of  patents and this paper
adopts a similar approach with a comparative survey of  three national patent systems during the first
industrial revolution, in order: Britain, the United States and France. The purpose is two-fold. First, to
show in a comparative framework, how the institutional design of  the patent system effects inventive
activity. Second, to show that patents can, under certain circumstances, provide a net benefit to society.
2 Great Britain
As the first  country  to industrialise,  the  example  of  Britain  (specifically  England)  has  a  particular
significance for this paper.  In the early modern period, England was a relatively successful organic
economy. Although population almost trebled between 1500 and 1700, it was still able to sustain an
increase in GDP per capita of  almost 50 percent (Broadberry et al., 2014). As with previous episodes of
prosperity, much of  this growth was Smithian in nature, based on expanding access to markets and so
allowing  for  greater  division  of  labour  over  larger  areas  –  although  without  further  technological
development,  the  returns  to  increasing  market  size  would  have  begun  to  diminish.  The  industrial
revolution,  which  is  traditionally  thought  to  have  begun  in  the  late  eighteenth  century,  was  the
harbinger of  a very different economic regime, where growth was now largely Schumpeterian in nature,
derived from an unceasing flow of  new, ever more productive, technology, replacing the obsolete and
outmoded.
Broadly speaking, there are two competing explanations for this technological transformation.
The first can be seen as a ‘demand-side’ explanation. This starts from the premise that inventive activity
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was principally motivated by material gain: ‘the decision
to incur costs to operationalise a technical idea was an economic one’  (Allen, 2009, p. 12). What was
unique about England, was that it was profitable to incur these costs and to invent the technology of
the industrial revolution. This was due in large part to the underlying structure of  the economy and
Bob Allen has emphasised the role of  factor prices (2009). But the availability of  patent protection was
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also important, as it meant that 'an inventor with an enforceable patent could recoup the development
costs' (2011, p. 368).  In a similar vein  Stephen Broadberry  et al argue that high wage rates in Britain
induced the adoption of  capital-intensive methods of  production (2009). Such methods were more
susceptible to technological improvement than those based on traditional handiwork. In the textile
industry, the transition to machinery had already occurred by 1770 and thereafter, inventive activities
were  'strengthened in the institutional  context  of  the  patent system in England, which provided a
stronger incentive to search for improvements in machine-intensive processes' (2009, pp. 295-7).
It  should be little  surprise  that  those economic historians  who have favoured demand-side
explanations have been attracted to patents as a contributory factor to industrialisation. Just as demand-
side explanations assume that inventors were commercially motivated and responded to market signals,
so the same logic underpins the granting of  patent rights. In contrast, 'supply-side' interpretations of
the industrial revolution emphasise exogenous developments in ideas as causative factors, rather than
economic pre-conditions. Deirdre McCloskey, for example, argues that perceptions of  entrepreneurial
activity  and the bourgeoisie  began to change in north-west  Europe during  the eighteenth century:
'ordinary  conversation  about  innovation  and  markets  became  more  approving',  allowing  both  to
flourish (2010, p. 7). McCloskey argues that it was these new ways of  thinking about business and
creativity that led to the industrial revolution. Because the industrial revolution had little, if  anything, to
do with  economic  incentives,  McCloskey  regards  patents  as  an irrelevance;  indeed,  by  obstructing
knowledge 'spillover', patents are supposed to have impeded the circulation of  these new ideas and the
technology  that  embodied  them (2010,  p.  337).  Joel  Mokyr  also  attributes  a  causative  role  in  the
industrial revolution to new ideas percolating throughout Europe. Beginning in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, there was a growing belief  that the material condition of  man could be improved
by increasing the stock of  knowledge and by making it widely available; an intellectual development
Mokyr labels the 'Industrial Enlightenment' (2005). He is,  however, careful not to entirely discount
more traditional economic and institutional explanations for the industrial revolution and although he
regards 'the British patent system [as] deeply flawed'  he does consider patenting to have incentivised
inventive activity via a demonstration effect (2009, p. 409). As long as there were a few lucky patentees
who were seen to profit from their endeavours, it  would provide a strong signal to other potential
inventors.
There are three initial reasons for supposing that patents made at least some contribution to
inventive  activity.  First,  patenting  became  far  more  common  after  1760,  when  England  began  to
industrialise. Figure 1 plots the annual number of  patents awarded in England between 1660 and 1851
(the last full year before the system was reformed). Between 1660-1760, few patents were awarded in
England; it was unusual for more than a dozen to be granted in any one year. Thereafter, however, the
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number of  patents increases rapidly so that in 1800, 96 patents were awarded and in 1850, 513.
Figure 1.1
English patents, 1660-1851
Second, very few important inventions or inventors of  the industrial revolution bypassed the
patent  system entirely.  In  one  exercise,  Ralf  Meisenzahl  and Mokyr  (2012)  examine  some of  the
characteristics of  72 'superstar' inventors born between 1660 and 1830. Of  these superstars, 81 percent
obtained at least one patent in the course of  their careers, 21 percent 10 or more. In a larger dataset,
including  an  additional  687  'tweakers'  or  'implementers'  (or  rather,  less  significant  inventors),
Meisenzahl and Mokyr find a lower propensity to patent - 40 percent of  their sample never obtained a
patent over the course of  their career and only 35 percent 2 or more. Meisenzahl and Mokyr consider
these to be modest figures, noting that 'a full 25 percent of  the superstars did not patent all of  their
inventions' (p. 473). Compared to what would likely be patenting rates today, these figures are indeed
modest. However, it also suggests that 75 percent of  important inventors  did patent the majority of
their important inventions: a scenario that is unlikely to have occurred at any previous point in time,
anywhere in the world. Moreover, these figures understate the proportion of  inventive output that was
patented.  First,  multiple inventions could be included in the same patent,  and this  was a  frequent
occurrence. Second, these figures exclude those inventors who did obtain patents, but used the name
of  their patent agent instead: one London agent, Moses Poole, was named on 105 different patents
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(Woodcroft, 1969). Finally, it excludes those inventors, such as Thomas Newcomen, who worked their
inventions under the patent of  another party, often a business partner.
Third, in a related point, until patent laws were passed in France and the United States in the
1790s, no other country in the world had a patent system which was used so frequently by inventors –
with the partial exception of  the Venetian Republic, which had instituted the world's first patent law in
1474 (Berverglieri, 1995).  Alas, empirical work on the British patent system depicts a system wherein
patents  were  often  prohibitively  difficult  to  obtain  and  rarely  enforceable  at  law  (Dutton,  1984,
MacLeod, 1988, 1991). Prior to reform in 1852,  the British patent system was not administered by a
single,  centralised authority  but rather,  a slew of  government  offices,  departments and law courts,
through  which  every  patent  petition  had  to  pass.  The  inventor  was  responsible  for  physically
transmitting their petition through every step, requiring personal attendance in London. This would not
have been so burdensome, if  the petition had not taken six months to negotiate and few inventors
could afford to abandon their business affairs for so long. Moreover, this ‘tortuous labyrinth’ (Dutton,
1984, p. 76) had to be negotiated twice more, if  an inventor sought protection in Scotland and Ireland.
Inevitably, patents were expensive to solicit – all told, an English patent cost about £145 during the first
half  of  the nineteenth century. As a multiple of  average earnings, the 1800 value would equate to
around £150,000 today; for 1850, around £105,000. Even with ‘statutory reforms in 1852 and 1883, it
[the patent system] remained barely fit for purpose’ (MacLeod and Nuvolari, 2010, p. 4).
Having paid their money, what was the inventor left with? Well, despite its convolution, the
petition procedure was entirely pro forma and patents issued as a matter of  course (MacLeod, 1988).
Without any examination of  the proposed patent, the legal cachet of  the eventual grant was necessarily
undermined and ‘the market value of  a patent depended upon a successful case at law’ (Dutton, 1984,
p. 179). Unfortunately for patentees, this was supposed to be exceedingly difficult to obtain, especially
before 1830. The judiciary were apparently hostile towards patentees and Dutton cites one instance
where  Chief  Justice  Kenyon  pronounced  himself,  ‘not  one  of  those  who  greatly  favour  patents'.
Although vague on how he defined ‘hostility’ or ‘prejudice’, Dutton is clear on how it manifested itself
– as an infeasibly strict interpretation of  the law, ‘allowing no error, however immaterial’ (1984, p. 77).
Under such circumstances, patentees were naturally loath to venture their patent rights in court. Dutton
estimates that between 1770 and 1799 only sixteen patents (compared with 1,418 awarded over the
same period) were litigated and in the absence of  any statutory law besides the antiquated Statute of
Monopolies (1624), there was almost no legal guidance for inventors. Such were the difficulties involved
with enforcing patents, they were rarely ‘worth the parchment [they were] written on’ (MacLeod, 1988,
p. 69).  It  was only around 1830, when there was an apparent  ‘sea-change’  in attitudes, that judicial
hostility was replaced by a growing appreciation of  patenting’s role in encouraging invention. The law
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courts eventually began to develop a coherent body of  law, placing patent rights on a more secure
footing. It was, for example, eventually confirmed in Crane v. Price (1842), that processes and methods
of  manufacture were patentable.
Recent work, however, suggests that the British patent system – decrepit as it might ostensibly
appear  –  was  adaptable,  and  that  important  changes  did  occur  to  improve  the  accessibility  and
enforceability of  patent rights  during the eighteenth and early  nineteenth centuries  (Cornish, 2010;
Gubby, 2012; Bottomley, 2014 (a, b)). One development of  particular importance was the appearance
of  patent agents in the third quarter of  the eighteenth century. By employing an agent, it was no longer
necessary for an inventor to transmit his petition through the various offices in person, and there was
actually very little they needed to do. In 1829, one agent testified before Parliament that ‘[T]he only acts
the inventor is obliged to perform himself, are the making of  an affidavit of  his having invented the
object  for  which  he  applies  for  the  patent;  paying  his  money;  and  afterwards,  making  out,
acknowledging and signing the specification of  that invention; all the rest may be done by his attorney,
or patent agent’ (quoted in Bottomley (a), p. 66). This could be done by post and by relieving inventors
of  the burden of  travelling to London, agents offered an extremely valuable service; by 1849, virtually
all inventors employed an agent (even if  they resided in the capital).
Agents also provided a variety of  ancillary services. First, they maintained extensive contacts
throughout Europe, helping inventors acquire protection abroad. The notebook of  one agent, Moses
Poole, shows that by the 1820s, he had representatives as far afield as Sweden and Russia (Bottomley,
2014 (a)). Inventors regularly availed themselves of  this service. In the 1820s, Britons obtained, at the
very least, 170 patents in France (6.3 percent of  the total awarded) and in the 1830s, 415 (7 percent of
the total awarded).v International patents were usually obtained with the intention of  selling the rights
on to locals. A noteworthy example was Henry Bessemer, who was able to sell an exclusive licence to
the Spanish patent for his steel converter, for £5,000 (Paetal and Saiz, 2012).
Second, agents  also maintained domestic contacts  with investors and manufacturers  for the
benefit of  their clients. Investors were able to help inventors with the expense of  obtaining patents
(with a view to obtaining a share for themselves) and the engineer Samuel Clegg (famous for his self-
activating meter, used to measure gas) claimed that ‘if  a workman has discovered anything … likely to
be beneficial, there is no difficulty in procuring anyone to join him in the expense of  taking out a
patent  for  it’  (quoted  in  Bottomley,  2014  (a),  p.  70).  Instances  where  important  inventions  went
unpatented for lack of  funds (such as happened to Samuel Crompton and his spinning mule in 1779)
were more unusual in the nineteenth century. As we will see, it was also common for manufacturers to
come to longer term arrangements with inventors, to work the patent in partnership. Third, because of
their familiarity with extant patents, agents often provided inventors with technical advice, especially on
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the practicability and patentability of  new inventions. The appearance of  patent agents made it much
easier for inventors to obtain patents (by 1849, the time taken to obtain a patent had fallen to one
month) and their importance has been hitherto understated.
Neither was the administration of  patents ossified – in response to the growing number of
petitions, the law officers, the officials primarily responsible for administering patents, increased the
number of  clerks they employed. The law officers also administered the system of  caveats.  A caveat
was a form submitted with a law officer, requesting that the caveat holder be given notice of  any patent
petition which pertained to a particular area of  interest,  as defined by the caveat.  Upon receipt of
notice, the holder could choose to oppose the petition at a hearing, if  he believed it conflicted with one
of  his own inventions. In the absence of  systematic examination of  petitions, the caveat system was
important  because  it  provided  the  only  means  by  which  the  claims  of  the  petitioner  might  be
investigated. From 1838 to 1847, the law officers held 1,687 caveat hearings, as a result of  which, 181
petitions were refused (equivalent to 3 percent of  the 5,993 petitions received over the same period)
and 203 petitions had to be amended (3.4 percent). For comparison, when systematic examination was
introduced in America in 1836, between 20 and 50 percent of  applications were refused, much higher
than the 6.4 percent of  English petitions which were refused or amended. Still, contemporaries thought
that caveats worked well and that they acted as a preventative check to illegal grants. One witness in a
select  committee investigating patents observed that  ‘the knowledge that a person may be stopped
before  the  Attorney-General,  prevents  persons  trying  to  play  tricks  which  would  otherwise  be
attempted’ (quoted in Bottomley, 2014 (a), p. 57). Caveat opposition was also thought to endow at least
some legal cachet to the eventual grant. In an 1849 Select Committee, on being asked ‘what part of  the
present system is that which you think gives such an efficient protection to the patentee?’  the patent
agent Frederick Campin replied, ‘I think these stages, the [law officers'] report, the bill and the Great
Seal, where we could have opposition’ (quoted in Bottomley, 2014 (a), p. 58).
The pre-reform patent system was by no means 'perfect'. High fees in particular, excluded many
from obtaining patent rights. But neither, however, was it as ineffective as has been suggested – the
problem with high fees,  for example,  was alleviated to some extent by the good offices of  patent
agents. Moreover, the enforceability of  patents has also been underestimated. First of  all, the notion
that the judiciary were implacably opposed to patents has been repudiated (Gubby, 2012). Rather, it is
clear that the large majority of  judges understood the rationale behind awarding patents. In Hornblower
v. Boulton & Watt (1799), Justice Grose observed that ‘the aim of  the Legislature is obvious … it was to
encourage ingenious artificers and able and studious men to invent and bring forward for the use of
the public new manufactures, the produce of  their ingenuity, by holding out to them the reward of  the
14 years’ monopoly’ (1 HPC 391). Earlier, in Arkwright v. Nightingale (1785), Lord Loughborough stated,
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‘[T]he law has established the right of  patents for new inventions; that law is extremely wise and just ’ (1
HPC 239).
Consequently, patentees were willing to take legal action to enforce their rights. Work on patent
cases in the Court of  Chancery between 1714 and 1758, shows that there were, at the very least, forty-
one cases instigated by patentees (Bottomley, 2014, (b)). The Court of  Chancery offered patentees a
variety of  legal remedies – most importantly, injunctions. An injunction was a court order restraining
the defendant from infringing the patent, or risk being found in contempt of  court and potentially
imprisoned.  For  inventors  who  had  been  working  their  patent  for  several  years,  injunctions  were
relatively easy to obtain (except when Lord Cottenham was Lord Chancellor, between 1836-1841 and
1846-1850) and they provided the most effectual means by which patentees could directly enforce their
right to exclusive use of  an invention. Moreover, if  patents could not have been enforced in the law
courts, then more informal enforcement mechanisms would have broken down – patentees could not
have credibly threatened interlopers. The ready availability of  injunctive relief  in the Court of  Chancery
meant patents could be enforced against infringements without always resorting to legal action.
One final  point  needs  to  be made concerning  the  substantive  development  of  patent  law.
Dutton suggested  that it was only in  1842, that the judiciary were able to decide that methods and
processes of  manufacture could be patented and that they were therefore dilatory in developing a body
of  legal precedent that was applicable to the rapidly changing economic and technological landscape of
the period. However, the patentability of  methods and processes does not appear to have exercised
contemporaries – it was generally understood that they could be patented. In  Boulton & Watt v.  Bull
(1795), for example, defence counsel did not try to dispute the admissibility of  methods as patents,
acknowledging that ‘the word manufacture is descriptive either of  the practice of  making a thing by art,
or of  the thing when made'. Similarly in Huddart v. Grimshaw (1803), Lord Ellenborough made reference
to  his  prior  experience  as  Attorney-General  and  agreed  that  different  methods  and  ‘modes’  of
manufacture were patentable even if  they all produced the same generic product:
It does not follow, that because the ends are materially the same, it is thereon open to the public. It
has happened to me in the same morning to give, as far as I was concerned, my consent to the
granting of  three different patents for the same thing; but the mode of  attaining it were all different,
and I thought I was entitled to receive them.
In theory, by allowing them to exclude other parties from using their invention, patents help
inventors  appropriate  returns  and  so  incentivise  the  development  of  new technology.  During  the
industrial revolution, inventors were able to enforce this exclusion on potential competitors – and this
resurrects the possibility that the patent system did indeed encourage the development and diffusion of
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technology. The crux of  the matter lies in whether inventors could actually use patents to appropriate
returns from inventive activities and if  so, how. It is especially important that inventors were able to
transact patent rights, for three principal reasons:
1.  Many inventors were unable to commercialise their  inventions themselves.  Instead,  by selling or
licensing their patent, inventors could realise returns without incurring the risk of  going into business.
2. By selling a portion of  the patent as part of  a partnership agreement, inventors could obtain access
to manufacturing plant and/or capital. Without sufficient capital, it is difficult to turn an invention to
profit.
3. Licensing allows other parties to use patented technology, facilitating the physical dissemination and
sequential development of  new technology.
Contemporaries  often commented upon the frequency of  these transactions and quantitative work
confirms this. Between 1770 and 1845, around 30 percent of  English patents were assigned in full (with
little  variation over the  whole  period)  and another 25 percent were  either assigned in part  and/or
licensed as well.vi
It is more difficult to demonstrate that these transactions were commensurate with the value of
the technology involved or suitably lucrative for the inventors concerned, (although such a judgement
will  be  somewhat  subjective).  Certainly  though,  there  were  many  inventors  during  the  industrial
revolution who failed to reap any rewards from their endeavours and ended their days in poverty – John
Kay,  James Hargreaves and Richard Trevithick to name but three.  Moreover,  Kay,  Hargreaves and
Trevithick  all  chose  to  patent  their  most  important  inventions  (respectively,  the  flying  shuttle,  the
spinning jenny and the  first high-pressure steam locomotive), but to no avail. Understandably, cases
such as these have led many to query whether patents ever helped inventors appropriate returns from
inventive activity; in the words of  Greg Clark: ‘the empirical difficulty with the appropriability argument
is the appallingly weak evidence that there was any great gain in the returns to innovators in England in
the  1760s  and  later  … the  Industrial  Revolution  economy  was  spectacularly  bad  at  rewarding
innovation' (2003, p. 20).
This, however, overlooks two important points. First, possessing a patent for an invention, even
one that posterity might recognise as ‘revolutionary’ or ‘ground-breaking’, does not mean that profits
will automatically ensue. Inventors needed to possess at least some degree of  business acumen (or if
they did not, to find a business partner who did) if  they wanted to introduce and commercialise new
technology in what was, relative to today, still a technologically conservative society. Second, and more
important still,  it overlooks what was unique about England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
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centuries. It is not that inventors sometimes failed to profit from patenting their inventions but that
others were able to do so at all: this was the first time and place where inventors were frequently able to
appropriate large returns from new technology via patenting. An early example is provided by Thomas
Newcomen who introduced his atmospheric engine (the first commercially viable steam engine) under
the auspices of  a pre-existing patent, along with the co-founders of  the “Proprietors of  the Invention
for Raising Water by Fire”. Newcomen earned, at the very least, £5,100 from dividends and share sales,
in addition to what he was able to earn when directly employed by engine users (Bottomley, 2014 (a)).
Even more profitable was the silk-winding machinery patented by Thomas Lombe in 1718 and worked
in partnership with his half-brother John and his cousin William. Over the course of  the patent term
(1718-1732, the standard fourteen years), Thomas made £80,000, and when he died in 1739, he was
able to leave his family £120,000, a colossal fortune by the standards of  the day (Prosser, 2004).
If  we move on to the period of  the industrial revolution proper (usually dated  c.1760-1830),
then there  was  a  multitude on inventors  who made their  fortune with  patented technology,  often
worked in partnership. Perhaps the most famous example was the partnership between James Watt (a
steam engineer who left over £60,000 in his will) and Matthew Boulton, although there were many
others such as Strutt, Need & Arkwright (cotton spinners); Marshall, Benyon & Murray (flax spinners)
and Neilson, MacIntosh & Wilson (iron founders; Dutton, 1984). These men often came from humble
backgrounds.  Thomas  Newcomen was  an  ironmonger  from Dartmouth,  Richard Arkwright  began
working  life  as  a  barber's  apprentice.  Thomas  Lombe's  father  has  been  a  worsted  weaver  from
Norwich; his daughters married into the aristocracy. It is difficult to envisage how Lombe et al. could
have accumulated such wealth over the course of  their lifetimes without proprietary rights over the
technology they developed. This re-establishes the point that it was possible for inventors – with luck –
to make their fortunes with patented technology.
The active market in patent rights also reduced the likelihood that patents would frustrate the
sequential development of  technology. Indeed, the ‘pyramidal conception’  of  patents – where if  an
inventor developed an improvement to a  product or process for which a patent was in force,  the
improvement could be used under licence – was of  extremely long standing (Cornish, 2010). In 1764,
for  example,  John Morris  patented  an  improvement  to  Jedediah  Strutt’s  stocking  frame (used  for
knitting ribbed stockings and itself  patented in 1759), which he was able to work under licence from
Strutt. 
As was discussed in the introduction though, James Watt's enforcement of  his patent for the
separate condenser is thought to have frustrated the development of  steam engineering and to have
'delayed  the  industrial  revolution  by  a  couple  of  decades'  (Boldrin  and Levine,  2013,  p.  38).  The
argument, however, is founded on three mistaken premises. First, Boldrin and Levine suggest that Watt
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wielded a virtual monopoly over the construction of  steam engines during the course of  his patent
term (1769-1800). However, Watt and his business partner Matthew Boulton were responsible for less
than  a  quarter  of  steam  engines  erections  during  this  period  (Kanefsky  and  Robey,  1980).
Consequently,  there was no change in the growth trend of  steam engine installation during Watt ’s
patent term – it did not confer that degree of  market power. Second, Boldrin and Levine assert that ‘it
is only after their patents expired that Boulton & Watt really started to manufacture steam engines ’
(2008, p. 2). Their accounts suggest otherwise. By the last full year of  their patent term (October 1799
to September 1800), Boulton & Watt were manufacturing goods to the value of  almost £30,000 per
annum (Bottomley, 2014 (a)).
Finally, Boldrin and Levine argue that Watt used his patent 'as a legal cudgel with which to
smash competition' (2008, p. 2). In particular, Watt was supposed to have used his patent against those
(in particular, Jonathan Hornblower) who were beginning to use steam at high pressures to actively
'push' against the piston, rather than using the pressure exerted by the atmosphere to 'pull' the piston
down. This would be significant because high-pressure compound engines became the predominant
engine design for stationary steam engines during the nineteenth century. However, during the 1780s,
Hornblower's engines worked poorly. They cost nearly three times what he had originally budgeted and
by 1785, Hornblower’s ‘engine man’ at Radstock colliery was feeding information to Watt in the hope
of  gaining employment with him instead. As long as Hornblower’s engines remained uncompetitive,
the partnership decided to take a relaxed attitude to his  endeavours:  ‘As to the trumpeting [Watt’s
occasional expression for Hornblower] if  anybody is wicked enough to erect one of  their Engines let
them, and when we can do no better lett us try the law’ (quoted in Bottomley, 2014, (a) p. 260).
Yet when the Hornblower engine did become a viable alternative in the 1790s, Boulton & Watt
refrained from taking legal action until 1799. There are two reasons for their apparent restraint. First,
the threat of  legal action proved to be sufficient for extracting royalties from those mine owners who
were using Hornblower’s engines. Ambrose Weston, Boulton & Watt's lawyer, believed that over the
course of  the patent term, mine owners had been intimidated into paying around £40,000 (although
this figure is probably an exaggeration; Hills, 2006). This explains why the partnership was able to wait
until 1799 to enjoin the use of  a Hornblower engine: they had no cause to. Second, Hornblower never
used the compound engine at high enough pressures for it to become fully competitive with Watt’s own
design; after the expiration of  Watt's patent in 1800, not a single engine was erected on Hornblower ’s
design. Instead, the opportunities presented by high-pressure compound steam engines would be first
exploited by Arthur Woolf, who patented his engines in 1804 and 1805.
This calls for a more nuanced interpretation of  the Watt patent and how it might have impeded
the  sequential  development  of  steam  engineering  –  it  was  possible  to  use  a  Hornblower  engine
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unmolested, as long as royalties were paid to Boulton & Watt as well. Of  course, the payment of  these
royalties would have increased the price of  a Hornblower engine and this would have disincentivised its
adoption by potential users, some of  whom may have been in a position to realise the benefits of  using
the it at higher pressures. Perhaps with more business, Hornblower would have come to realise this for
himself. But the argument is now more speculative, and one that is unlikely to be proven.
Instead, a much stronger, positive, argument can be made that the patent system encouraged
sequential technological development by enabling the diffusion of  technical information. After 1734,
inventors had to submit a detailed written description of  their invention at the Court of  Chancery – the
'specification'.  This  requirement  formed the  jurisprudential  basis  of  the  English  patent  which was
conceived as a contract. In 1789, for example, Justice Buller observed that ‘the consideration which the
patentee gives for his monopoly, is the benefit which the public are to derive from his invention after
the patent is expired; that benefit is secured to them by means of  a specification of  the invention’ (1
HPC 327). If  the description was found to be inadequate, the patent was annulled, and inventors spent
up  to  £200  hiring  technical  and  legal  assistance  for  preparing  their  specifications.  Moreover,
specifications were not encumbered with legalise – it  was a specific criterion, that they were to be
intelligible to a mechanic or workman, albeit one who had some familiarity with the relevant area of
technology (see, for example, Boulton & Watt v. Bull (1795), 1 HPC 380).
Anyone could visit  Chancery to consult a specification, and during a period when technical
information was not always readily available and/or verifiable, patent specifications came to form a
uniquely  reliable  and  up-to-date  source  of  industrial  technology.  Inventors  and  manufacturers
frequently consulted specifications at the Court of  Chancery and it was observed that the availability of
specifications entirely undermined the prohibition on the export of  machinery then in force. In 1824
Bryan Donkin observed that 'a foreigner,  or any person, for a  few shillings,  can go to our record
offices, and examine a specification, containing a description of  the best machines we have, because for
all the most valuable machines patents are obtained; specifications are by law registered there, and the
offices are open to any man, and copies may be obtained at a small expense’ (quoted in Bottomley 2014
(a), p. 198). Moreover, specifications were frequently published in contemporary technical journals (for
example, The Repertory of  Arts or Mechanics Magazine) and, indeed most of  the material carried by these
publications  was  derived  from patents.  These  publications  enjoyed large  circulations  (the  Mechanics
Magazine  sold 16,000 copies a week at  3d.)  and by publishing patent specifications,  they  offered a
significantly cheaper way of  obtaining the latest technical information than if  it had remained in tacit
form/worked in secret – a likely scenario in the absence of  patent protection. The ready availability of
patent specification should also have reduced the wasteful duplication of  inventive activity.
The British patent system was by no means perfect, their expense certainly limited access to its
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provisions. It has been suggested that high fees were retained to 'deliberately generate disincentives for
inventors  from humble backgrounds'  (Khan, 2011,  p.  28)  and that  there  was a pervasive  belief  in
Europe 'that only a very narrow group of  the population was capable of  truly important contributions
to technological knowledge' (Khan and Sokoloff, 2008, p. 140). This is an unfair assessment of  'elite'
views (as evidenced by the parliamentary select committees on patents) and of  'popular' views; literary
evidence shows that inventors were often represented sympathetically and/or romantically as geniuses
of  humble stock, toiling alone in their workshop (Pettit, 2004). Instead, high fees, along with caveat
opposition, was used as a filtering mechanism, limiting the number of  patents that were awarded and
reducing the chances  of  a  patent thicket  developing in the  absence of  systematic  examination.  In
addition,  consistent with the jurisprudential  emphasis  on the specification,  sufficiency requirements
were strictly enforced (see, for example, Turner v Winter (1789), 1 HPC 321), reducing the likelihood of
overlapping  patents.  It  has  also  been established  that  patents  were  enforceable,  and  the  Court  of
Chancery was a particularly  important and effective tribunal for patentees seeking to enforce their
rights  to exclusivity.  Consequently,  many inventors were able to appropriate returns from inventive
activities and without the provision of  patent rights, research projects where the resultant technology
could not have been commercialised in secret – such as was often the case in  steam engineering and
manufacturing machinery (sectors that were integral to the industrial revolution) –  would rarely have
been privately profitable. 
3 The United States
Prior to independence, patents for the American colonies were obtainable in London and they could
even be litigated there.vii Similarly, individual states granted patents, the first such award occurring in
Massachusetts in 1646 (Khan, 2010). Drawing on British practice, the founders of  the new Republic
were determined to offer protection to new inventions (although they consciously diverged in some
important respects, e.g. American patents were much cheaper at $35). In the first Article of  the United
States Constitution, Congress was mandated to 'promote the Progress of  Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries' (Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). A year after the Constitution came into force, the first patent legislation
was  passed by Congress.  Initially,  it  required patent  applications  to  be examined by  the  Attorney-
General (Edmund Randolph), the Secretary of  War (Henry Knox) and the Secretary of  State (Thomas
Jefferson). Thorough as this was, it  consumed the valuable time of  senior political figures and the
examination of  patent applications was abandoned in 1793. In its place, a system of  straightforward
registration was instituted,  which made no provision for the examination of  applications and even
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obvious copies could be patented (Thomson, 2009).
Non-examination appears to have produced the worst of  both worlds. Many specious patents
were awarded which were used to harass manufacturers and businessmen. One noteworthy example
was Michael Withers, who in 1827 was able to obtain a patent for bevelling gudgeons, an important
component in water mills – even though bevelled gudgeons were already available. Withers's strategy
was to wait until a water mill had been erected before pursuing the owner for royalties. Few had the
resources to resist Withers and paid up. If  Withers was challenged, he would abandon the contest and
find another, more amenable, target (Jaffe and Lerner, 2005). Without any examination of  applications,
the responsibility for divining the legality of  patents was devolved entirely to the law courts – and with
patents such as Withers's being awarded, few were able to stand up in court.  In the 1820s, only a
quarter of  verdicts went in favour of  patent holders (Khan, 2005). Khan has rightly observed that such
bald figures cannot be interpreted as evidence of  anti-patent bias on the part of  the judiciary, but the
knowledge that the courts rarely found patents valid must have offered succour and encouragement to
(well-resourced) infringers, undermining the returns to invention for bona fide inventors. By the 1830s,
many were unhappy. One judge thundered that the system was 'producing evils of  great magnitude'
(quoted in Jaffe and Lerner, 2005, p. 127). Such problems were increasing in step with the number of
patents  being  awarded  (752  in  1835),  and  the  'costs  of  enforcing  these  property  rights  were
approaching levels that threatened the viability of  the system, and inhibited inventive activity' (Sokoloff,
1988, p. 818). Neither was the early patent system an effective agent for diffusing technology – the first
superintendent of  the USPTO, William Thornton, did not believe that patent specifications should be
publicised until after the patent had expired, a practice that only ended in 1825 (Thomson, 2009).  
Consequently, in 1836, the American patent system was completely overhauled. The patent fee
was maintained at the modest sum of  $30, but in a reform that would (eventually) provide the template
for changes abroad, an intensive examination of  applications by technically qualified examiners was
instituted. They were charged with assessing the novelty and legality of  every prospective patent and
many  of  these  early  examiners  were  very  distinguished:  the  Patent  Office  at  this  time  was  'truly
remarkable for its concentration of  scientific expertise' (quoted in Thomson, 2009, p. 193). They were
also scrupulous and as was noted in section 2, up to half  of  all applications were rejected. Technical
examination provided reassurance to potential investors of  the patents legality (in the 1840s, nearly 60
percent of  verdicts were in favour of  patentees; Khan, 2005) and the practicability of  their invention.
Before 1836, the transfer of  patent rights had often been hindered by their insecurity, but the mid-
nineteenth century saw a rapid growth and development in the market for technology (Lamoreaux and
Sokoloff, 2001). By the 1870s, some 70-80 percent of  US patents were being assigned. Unlike in Britain
(which  is  obviously  much  smaller),  many  patent  assignments  were  geographically  restricted  –
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accounting  for  71.4  percent  of  all  assignment  contracts  registered  at  the  patent  office  in  1851.
However, with improvements in communications, especially the growth of  the railways, this figure fell
to 22.8 percent in 1871 and 4.6 percent in 1891 (Lamoreaux et al., 2013).
The discussion on British patents emphasised the importance of  the market in patent rights in
expediting  the  sequential  development  of  technology  and  as  a  means  by  which  inventors  could
appropriate returns and obtain capital to work new inventions. In the United States, this very high
propensity to trade in patents also contributed to the professionalisation of  invention. Now it was
possible for talented inventors to concentrate on research while leaving the commercialisation of  their
ideas to others. A survey of  'great inventors' born between 1846-65, shows that 66 percent derived their
main source of  income from selling and/or licensing their patents – although the numbers of  great
inventors pursuing this strategy had always been relatively high (Khan and Sokoloff, 2004). In a similar
vein, the proportion of  patents which were awarded to individuals who received ten or more patents
over their careers increased from 4.4 percent in 1830-42, to 28.9 percent by 1870-71
The  market  spawned  a  range  of  intermediaries.  Patentees  could  hire  specialist  agents  in
different parts of  the country to hawk their inventions to locals – although the reliability of  these
agents was occasionally impeached. Sometimes, they were accused of  exaggerating the value of  the
invention  and unfrotunately for buyers,  the courts are reported to have 'followed a rule of  caveat
emptor', and money could only be reclaimed if  the patent vendor had acted fraudulently (Lamoreaux et
al.,  2013, p. 11). A more trustworthy source of  agency services were the large national firms. They
often published their own magazines which could be used to advertise their cleints inventions.  Scientific
American, which was owned by the patent agency Munn & Co., printed lists of  patents that had been
awarded  and  detailed  descriptions  of  inventions.  Favourable  coverage  of  their  clients'  invention
encouraged business (Lamoreaux  et al.,  2013). In Britain, the largest technical magazines such as  The
Repertory of  Arts and The Mechanics’ Magazine were edited by patent agents as well.
After 1836, the United States probably boasted the most sophisticated patent system in the
world; the introduction of  professional examiners, working in a specialised patent office would in time
form the template for all future Patent Offices. Khan concludes that patent 'policies helped to propel
the United States to the first rank among developed countries' (2005, p. 309). Despite this 'democratic'
patent system, however, Petra Moser still reports a low propensity to patent. Of  the 550 American
exhibits at the Great Exhibition of  1851, only 15.3 percent had been patented. The figure for Britain
was lower still at 11.1 percent (Moser, 2012). These figures, though, understate the propensity to patent
new inventions. In particular,  exhibiting an unpatented invention would have constituted an act of
publication, invalidating any subsequent patent that might be obtained. As such, inventors intending  to
obtain a patent would refrain from entering such an Exhibition. Moreover, many of  these exhibits were
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not patentable – examples of  high quality workmanship abound at these fairs, for instance – and when
they are excluded from exhibition data, the propensity to patent patentable exhibits is shown to be much
higher (Khan, 2013 (a)).viii Because those inventions which are truly novel products and/or methods of
manufacture (and which are therefore patentable) lead to the most dramatic changes in producivity
then, from an economic standpoint, one can still argue that patents are important.
Great efforts were also made to diffuse the mass of  technical material that passed through the
Patent Office which was published promptly and freely distributed to libraries throughout the country.
In 1849, one examiner did complain of  'the almost boundless and ill arranged masses of  information
to be found in the books, the shops and in the archives of  the patent office' (quoted in Thomson, 2009,
p. 214) but this seems to be more a symptom of  success. There was a growing range of  both general
magazines and more specialised publications such as The Journal of  the Society of  Glass Technology and The
American  Journal  of  Photography  which  digested  this  material  and  informed  inventors  of  the  latest
developments in areas of  interest (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff,  1999). A recent spatial autocorrelation
analysis demonstrates that the American patent system was exceptionally conducive to the diffusion of
new technology – if  patenting doubled in one county, then patents in neighbouring counties would
increase by 29 percent and this effect was significant even when controlling for manufacturing labour
force and urban amenities. By contrast, no similar knowledge spillovers can be isolated for unpatented
exhibits from the industrial fairs of  the American Institute of  New York between 1835 and 1870.ix
4 France
As with the English patent, the French privilège awarded to inventors during the ancien régime had initially
developed within a much larger apparatus of  monarchical grants. There were many types of  privilège
awarded, perhaps the most important being fiscal in nature, which excused the holder from paying
certain  types  of  tax.  Similarly,  since  the  medieval  period,  certain  groups  of  merchants  and
manufacturers  had  been  afforded  state  protection  via  the  privilège,  and  these  form  the  closest
institutional precursor to the inventors' privilège.  Privilèges  for inventors could take two forms. The first
type were 'ordinary', and usually they only excused the inventor from working within the remit of  a
manufacturing guild (Hilaire-Pérez, 1991). The second group were 'exclusive'  privilèges, and these were
more alike modern patents, granting exclusive rights to inventors, (although they were often limited to a
particular locality). Also, to be eligible for a  privilège, the invention needed to be 'politic': it could not
conflict with government policy. 
Petitions were usually first submitted to the Paris Académie des Sciences which was charged with
appraising the technical aspects of  the invention. After this, the petition was passed to the  Bureau de
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Commerce and then the  Contrôleur Général des Finances,  who were responsible for deciding whether the
interests of  the state would be met by providing the inventor with a  privilège.  The privilège could then
issue as an arrêt du conseil (royal council decree) – although such a decree needed to be registered with
the Parlement de Paris (a judicial rather than legislative body). The Parlement would take the opportunity to
examine the propspective privilège of  its own accord and to hear opposition from those opposed to the
privilège  (usually  the guilds).  Few inventors were able to negotiate such a convoluted and politicised
petition process;  between 1715 and 1760,  only 48 exclusive  privilèges were awarded (Plasseraud and
Savignon, 1986). A royal decree of  1762 clarified and delineated the terms on which the inventors'
privilège  would be granted. Now, the term was set for fifteen years and the invention needed to be
worked within one year, or otherwise the  privilège  was annulled (Hilaire-Pérez, 1991). Administrators,
though, were still reluctant to award exclusive  privilèges  to inventors. Instead, financial awards became
the preferred means of  encouraging inventive efforts and from 1740 to 1780, the French state doled
out some 7 million livres to reward various inventions. The large majority of  these inventions proved to
be useless  (Rosen,  2010),  and on the eve of  Revolution,  many regarded state policy  to encourage
invention  as  a  failure.  In  1788,  the députés  du  commerce warned that  until  reform occurred,  French
inventors  ‘would continue to seek patents in the United Kingdom and not work their invention in
France’ (quoted in Duncan, 1997, p. 38). Accordingly, the English patent system was viewed as a model
for reform. One proponent was Jean-François de Tolozan, head of  the Bureau du commerce from 1787 to
1791: 'Je fond mon avis sur l'expérience constante des anglais, qui n'ont acquis sur nous dans les arts une si grande
supériorité qu'en accordant des privilèges à tous ceux qui en demandent'.x
The  entire  system  of  privilèges was  swept  away  by  the  French  Revolution,  providing  the
opportunity  to institute  new state  policies  for  encouraging invention;  a  delegation  of  artisans  and
inventors was soon assembled to petition the new government for ' l'établissement en France d'une législation
comparable  à  celle  des  patentes  anglaises'  (quoted  in  Galvez-Behar,  2008  (a),  p.  23).  However,  in  the
revolutionary ferment of  the time, many were leery of  awarding any new rights of  protection.  To
appease opponents, Stanislas de Boufflers,  the nobleman charged with drafting the new patent law,
appealed to the inalienable rights of  man: 's'il  existe  une véritable propriété pour un homme, c'est sa pensée '
(quoted in Galvez-Behar, 2008 (a), p. 23). The preamble to the law of  9 January 1791 re-affirmed that
'it would be to attack the rights of  man in their essence, not to regard a discovery in industry as the
property of  its author'. These rights were perceived to exist independently of  this legislation and the
system it  instituted.  As  such,  it  was  possible  for  an 1801 decree  to state  that  the  brevet  d'invention
represented a 'mere recognition of  property'  and accordingly,  the French  Bureau des  brevets did not
concern itself  with examining applications, instead awarding brevets as a matter of  right and confining
itself  to 'a recording function' (Hilaire-Pérez, 1991, p. 931). Even if  the prospective patent was known
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to cover a pre-existing invention, the  Bureau  could not block the application (Perpigna, 1832, p. 52).
Despite several reforms of  the French patent system (most notably in 1844, which formed the bedrock
of  French patent law until 1968), examination of  patent applications was never introduced during the
nineteenth-century.
These idealised notions of  the natural rights of  inventors proved to be influential and several
countries such as Brazil in 1809, Russia in 1812 and Spain in 1820 adopted French legislation wholesale,
along  with  its  unequivocal  reference  to  the  natural  rights  of  inventors.xi However,  De  Boufflers'
emphasis on the natural rights of  inventors – although sincere – had been exaggerated for 'tactical'
reasons and some provisions of  the 1791 law were clearly inconsistent with the idealised notion of  the
inventors' natural rights. For example, novelty was only decided relative to domestic use, allowing for
technology to be imported and patented by someone other than the inventor (a provision based on
English practice; Duncan, 1997). Similarly, working requirements meant that the inventor had to have
commercialised the invention within two years, otherwise the patent was forfeit. Finally,  le brevet  was
expensive  to  obtain.  Until  1844,  a  fifteen  year  patent  cost  1500₣  or  around  £60,  excluding  the
additional costs of  an agent and technical assistance with the specification.
Moreover,  French patents  were  often difficult  to enforce  at  law.  Louis-Benjamin  Francœur,
professor  at  the  Faculté  des  sciences  de  Paris,  bemoaned the indulgence shown by the  courts  towards
infringers and lauded the severity with which they were treated in England (Galvez-Behar, 2008 (a)).
The law was also applied inconsistently by the courts: in 1850, Jean-Baptiste Dumas, the Minister of
Commerce, complained that 'a patent, valid in a jurisdictional court, is void in the neighbouring one;
such an act of  counterfeiting in Paris, elsewhere escapes any repression' (Galvez-Behar, 2008 (b) p. 8).
Indeed, if  it was decided that a patentee's legal action had been vexatious, they could be fined up to
6000₣ (Perpigna,  1832,  p.  128).  The  difficulties  involved  with  enforcing  patents,  dissuaded  many
inventors  from obtaining patents,  especially  those living in  the provinces.  For  example,  during  the
nineteenth-century,  the Nord department (bordering Belgium) was the most heavy industrialised in
France. In 1860, (for when there are the earliest available figures), Nord was second only to the Seine
department (which contained Paris) in terms of  the value of  its manufacturing output (Combes et al.,
2008). Yet in the 1830s, Nord accounted for only 2 percent of  all patents awarded in France and in the
1840s 2.4 percent. These figures are roughly in line with the proportion of  the French population who
lived there (3 percent in 1836) but entirely divorced from the proportion of  French industry located
there.xii
That so few patents originated from the industrial heartland of  France, implies that brevets gave
little  encouragement  to inventive  activity.  It  also seems that  the  problems involved with enforcing
French patents precluded the development of  an active market in patent rights. Between 1844 and
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1846, the number of  patents assigned in full, as a percentage of  the number of  patents awarded over
the same period,  was only 7.7 percent. From 1859 to 1861, this figure was even lower,  at just 3.5
percent.xiii Without a well functioning market in patent rights, the commercial opportunities available to
inventors in France were obviously curtailed. It would also have stymied the sequential development of
technology and some of  the specific provisions of  French patent law aggravated this problem. For
example, if  a product was protected by a patent and a better method for its production appeared, use
of  this new method would still be regarded as an infringement of  the original product patent. For a
long time, this was regarded as 'un frein au progrès' (Galvez-Behar, 2008 (a), p. 42).
Neither does it  appear that the French patent system expedited the circulation of  technical
information.  In his initial 1790 report on the patent system, De Boufflers had also stressed how the
patent could be conceived as a social contract, and the law of  9 January 1791 allowed for the free
consultation of  specifications (although only for 'tout citoyen domicilé'). This contractual conceptualisation
of  the patent came to form a longer lasting jurisprudential base for the French brevet than natural rights;
the patent agent Antoine Perpigna observed that a patent 'is a contract made between the nation on the
one side, represented by the government, and the inventor' and in return for their patent, the inventor
had to meet certain conditions 'among which is the express one of  giving up at once his secret, which
at  the  expiration  of  his  privilege  is  to become public  property'  (1832,  p.  17).  However,  inventors
complained bitterly about the availability of  specifications and from 1811, they could only be accessed
with  permission  of  the  Ministre du  Commerce.  This  permission  was  not  forthcoming  and  unless
patentees chose to publicise their  invention themselves,  specifications were effectively unobtainable
until the patent expired (Galvez-Behar, 2008 (a)). When the patent system was reformed in 1844, it was
decided  that  Le  Conservatoire  national  des  arts  et  métiers  should  be  entrusted  with  the  publication  of
specifications during the patent term. Unfortunately, publication of  La Description des machines et procédés
by  Le Conservatoire proved to be partial and much delayed. Specifications entered in 1854 were only
published in 1859, and those entered in 1860 appeared in 1870 and learned socities such as La Société
d'encouragement pour l'industrie nationale wanted the British system of  immediate publication to be adopted
(Galvez-Behar (a), 2008).
Ostensibly, the French law of  1791 upheld the natural rights of  inventors. The incipient French
patent office was limited to a mere recording function and there was no examination of  the patent
application. However, several provisions of  the new law contradicted such high-flown notions, viz., the
strict working requirements. Natural rights only formed an organising principle of  the French  brevet
when it was convenient to do so. Instead, a contractual notion of  the patent came to pre-dominate. But
again, this was usurped and from 1811 onwards specifications of  extant patents could only be accessed
with great difficulty.
23
It is difficult to make the case that French specifications did anything to assist with the diffusion
of  technology. Neither does it appear that they did much to incentivise technological development. As
easy as they were to obtain, the French brevet was as difficult to enforce against infringers. Uncertainty
over their enforceability largely precluded the development of  a market in patent rights. We can take
the example of  Henry Fox Talbot, an early pioneer of  photography and inventor of  the 'Calotype' the
first form of  photography where unlimited copies of  the image could be made. To profit from his
invention, Talbot obtained patent rights in Britain, France and the United States. In France,  Talbot
entered into an agreement with a Marquis  de Bassano to found a  Compagnie  Calotype in 1843.  The
Compagnie  collapsed when Talbot discovered that Bassano was usurping his rights by patenting a near
identical  process in his  own name. Talbot could neither challenge Bassano's  patent application nor
enforce his own against it and his French venture failed. In the United States, by contrast, Talbot was
able to sell his patent for £1,000 to Wilhelm and Friedrich Langenheim (although only after protracted
negotiations; Bottomley, 2012).
5 Conclusion
Because the propensity for British and American exhibits to be patented at the Great Exhibition in
1851 were similar, Petra Moser suggests that 'patenting decisions were unresponsive to differences in
patent law' (2012 p. 43). As section 2 showed, however, recent historiographical work on the British
patent system has produced a more favourable assessment of  its efficacy and now the similarity in the
propensity to patent between the United States and Britain can be explained in a simpler way – it was
because the efficacy of  protection offered in the two countries was broadly the same. Interestingly, the
propensity  to  patent  French  exhibits  was,  at  7.4  percent,  less  than  half  that  of  America  (Royal
Commission, 1851).
What this  paper has shown is that differences in the institutional  parameters of  the patent
system do matter. The patent represents the right to exclude others from using a protected technology.
Where the means of  enforcing this exclusivity are seldom available, such as was the case in France,
patents  will  be  of  marginal  importance.  In  a  related  point,  the  transaction  costs  involved  with
transferring insecure property rights are often prohibitive and a market in patent rights – an important
way in which inventors can appropriate returns – can only develop where patents are clearly defined
and secure. It is telling that the proportion of  patents which were exchanged in the United States (post
1836) and Britain was considerably higher than in France.
The  legality  and  security  of  patent  rights  is  derived  in  part  from  the  criteria  by  which
applications for them are assessed. Where the criteria are fluid and malleable, as when patents need to
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be deemed politically or economically expedient, they will also be inherently insecure. Such was the case
in ancien régime France, where inventors needed to negotiate with multiple bureaucracies. Indeed, many
inventors were effectively cut off  from privilèges  altogether. Similarly, when there is no examination at
all, many spurious patents will issue and unless courts adjudicate patents strictly, manufacturers will be
harassed by speculative attacks.
When,  however,  applications  are  decided  by  consistent  legal  criteria,  those  patents  that  are
passed will be more secure and well defined: once America introduced systematic examination, there
was considerable growth in the market for technology. Regression analysis on international patenting
between 1840 and 1920 confirms that patent assignments were more frequent in systems involving
examination  (Khan,  2013  (b)).  Britain  provides  a  more  complicated  example.  Political  actors  had
refrained from interfering in patents from the middle of  the eighteenth century onwards but there was
also an aversion to systematically investigating the legality of  prospective patents. Instead, very high
fees and frequent private oppositions were preferred mechanisms for filtering out 'undesirable' patents
and judging from the high proportion of  patents which were transferred, this worked tolerably well.
Charging  higher  application  fees  today  would  discourage  the  patenting  of  lower  value  inventions,
reducing  the  burden  of  examination  at  Patent  Offices  and  the  social  costs  of  patent  thickets.
Examination also forces the inventor to clearly describe their invention, usually in the specification.
When these specifications were made publicly available and their sufficiency assessed by appropriate
standards, they made a significant contribution to the circulation of  technical information and this in
turn facilitated the sequential development of  technology.
There is one final area concerning institutional design that has yet to be broached – the patent
term. In the United States and Britain, patents lasted for fourteen years; in France, for a maximum of
fifteen (extensions could, with difficulty, be obtained in each country). In Britain, the patent term had
been settled by the mid-seventeenth century, when it was decided  that patents of  twenty one years
should  no longer  be  awarded as it  took too long  ‘before  the  Commonwealth  should  be partaker
thereof ’ (Coke, 1669, vol.3, p. 184). Product cycles are now much shorter today than they were 350
years ago. One, this was a period where novelty and invention was not always greeted with the same
abandon as they are today; it took a long time for a new product or process to establish itself. Two,
reliable  communications  were  much  slower.  Not  only  did  this  stymie  the  diffusion  of  technical
information, it made it more difficult for prospective adopters to verify its practicability without costly
experimentation. Yet today, we have seen fit to revert to a patent term that lasts twenty years. This
allows holders to rights in obsolete technology to continue to hold out for licence fees and royalties and
for  many  large  companies,  enforcement  activities  on  obsolete  patents  have  become  an  important
revenue stream. Patent terms can probably be reduced dramatically, without radically undermining the
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incentive to invent, while clearing away much of  the patent thicket.
Finally,  it  is  important  that  the  institutional  parameters  of  the  patent  system are  carefully
calibrated: the paper has also endeavoured to show that a well designed patent system does encourage
inventive activity. In the British case, patent rights allowed some inventors to become extremely wealthy
and the returns appropriable with a patent did encourage the development of  technology. However, the
British  case  also  confirms  Qian's  observation  that  the  provision  of  patent  rights  will  be  of  no
consequence  in  countries  that  do  not  already  have  inventive  potential.  Ireland  possessed  a  patent
system that was derived directly from the one in England, yet it saw very little inventive activity in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bottomley, 2014 (c)) and remained an extremely poor and agrarian
society – tragically evidenced by the Great Famine of  1845-49. This shows that the patent system was
not in itself  a sufficient cause for industrialisation, i.e.  it  does not alter the  ‘background’  economic
conditions  that  determine  whether  an  invention  can  ever  be  commercially  feasible.  Rather,  the
provision of  patent rights reduced the threshold at which it became privately efficient to develop new
technology. It also seems that patents contributed to technological development in America, where a
thriving  market  in  technology  rights  offered  inventors  the  opportunity  to  sell  their  ideas  without
incurring the risk of  commercialising them and facilitating the professionalisation of  invention later in
the nineteenth century.
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ix Khan 2014. One recent study, however, found that patent disclosures have almost no impact on information
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